TCP-based flooding attacks are a common form of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks which abuse network resources and can bring about serious threats to the Internet. Incorporating IP spoofing makes it even more di cult to defend against such attacks. Among di erent IP spoofing techniques, which include random spoofing, subnet spoofing and fixed spoofing, subnet spoofing is the most di cult type to fight against. In this paper, we propose a simple and e cient method to detect and defend against TCP SYN flooding attacks under di erent IP spoofing types, including subnet spoofing. The method makes use of a storage-e cient data structure and a change-point detection method to distinguish complete three-way TCP handshakes from incomplete ones. Simulation experiments consistently show that our method is both efficient and e ective in defending against TCP-based flooding attacks under di erent IP spoofing types.
Introduction
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are large-scale cooperative attacks typically launched from a large number of compromised hosts. DDoS attacks are bringing about growing threats to businesses around the world. While many methods have been proposed to counter such attacks, they are either not e cient or not e ective enough. Some recent DDoS incidents show that such attacks continue to cause serious threats to the Internet.
DDoS attacks are even more di cult to fight against if IP spoofing is incorporated into such attacks. IP spoofing, or called source IP address spoofing, refers to the technique of lying about the return address (i.e., source address) of a packet. With IP spoofing, attackers can gain unauthorized access to a computer or a network by making it appear that a message has come from a certain trusted machine by "spoofing" the IP address of that machine. Strictly speaking, IP spoofing is not an attack by itself; it is merely a scheme used with DDoS attacks.
Spoofing techniques can be categorized into di erent types according to what spoofed source addresses are used in the attacking packets. The three common IP spoofing types are random spoofing, subnet spoofing, and fixed spoofing [8] . In random spoofing, the attacker randomly generates 32-bit numbers for use as source addresses of the attacking packets. In subnet spoofing, the addresses are generated from the address space corresponding to the subnet in which the agent machine resides. For example, a machine which is part of the 143.89.124.0/24 network may spoof any address in the range from 143.89.124.0 to 143.89.124.255. Another type of IP spoofing, called fixed spoofing, chooses source addresses from a given list. In this case, the attacker typically wants to perform a reflector attack or impose a blame for attack on several specific machines.
To defend against spoofed flooding tra c, especially that with subnet spoofing, we propose a scheme that is based on a storage-e cient data structure and a change-point detection method. The storage-e cient data structure, which is a variant of Bloom filter [3] , is used to generate a hash digest of the tra c. The change-point detection method is based on the CUSUM algorithm [4] , which is a nonparametric change-point detection method. After some information about the tra c is extracted and stored in the Bloom filter, CUSUM is then applied to detect abnormal changes in the digested tra c.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first review some basics about TCP hand-shakes in Section 2. In Section 3, a space-e cient data structure called Bloom filter is reviewed. Our method makes use of a modified Bloom filter to store a hash digest of the relevant portions of a packet. The CUSUM based change-point detection scheme is presented in Section 4. The experimental results reported in Section 5 show that our method can accurately detect spoofed flooding tra c under di erent IP spoofing types. Finally, Section 6 presents some related work in the area of DDoS research and Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines some further research issues.
TCP Handshakes
Most existing DDoS attacks exploit the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [9] . It has been reported that more than 90% of the existing DDoS attacks are TCP based [12] , although we do expect that attacks of other types, such as UDP based, will increase in the future as more and more applications based on them become available in the Internet. It is well known that IP spoofing is one of the major security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite, and hence it is commonly exploited by attackers to launch attacks. In what follows, we will first look at TCP handshakes for normal transactions and then those for spoofed ones.
During normal TCP handshakes, the client first sends a SYN request to the server. After receiving the request, the server replies with a packet which contains both the acknowledgement ACK and the synchronization request SYN (denoted as ACK/SYN hereinafter). Then the client sends an ACK back to the server to complete the establishment of the TCP connection.
Under IP spoofing, however, the three-way handshake will be very di erent from that of the normal case. Attackers usually use unreachable spoofed source IPs in the attacking packets to improve the attack efficiency [10] . These packets will not trigger the third round of an otherwise three-way handshake. Under random IP spoofing, most connections will not receive the second round of each handshake because the ACK/SYN packets are sent to other subnets. Under subnet spoofing, however, ACK/SYN packets are sent to the correct subnet but are destined to an incorrect host. The third round of the handshake is thus unsuccessful. As a consequence, a major di erence between random spoofing and subnet spoofing is the di erent return paths of the ACK/SYN packets.
Our method tries to detect incomplete handshakes by monitoring the first and third rounds of each handshake. If either round is missing, it is regarded as an incomplete handshake. We use the first and third rounds because both of them belong to the outgoing tra c. Therefore, our method which requires only one-way tra c monitoring has the advantage of being flexible and hence can easily be deployed at the source side, the intermediate network or the victim side.
Tra c Information Digest
Accurate detection of anomalies has to rely on detailed information analysis. However, storing detailed tra c information for subsequent analysis is generally very expensive. In order to extract useful information about abnormal (i.e., incomplete) handshakes, we choose to record only information about TCP handshakes. Moreover, we use a storage-e cient data structure for this purpose. In this section, we first give a brief overview of such a data structure. We then discuss how to extract useful information from the network tra c.
Bloom filter
Bloom filter was first proposed by Bloom [3] in 1970. Recently, it has been adapted for use in some methods for defending against DDoS attacks [2, 5, 11] . A Bloom filter is composed of a vector v of bits, initially all set to 0. We have independent hash functions, 1 2 , each with a range 0 1 1. The vector v can show the existence of an element from some address space . Given an element , the bits at positions ( ) 1 , in v are set to 1. Note that a particular bit may be set to 1 multiple times and hence may potentially lead to inaccurate results. Given a query on the existence of in , we check the bits at positions ( ) 1 . If any one of them is 0, then is certainly not in . Otherwise, we conjecture that is in it. However, there is a certain probability that the Bloom filter will give a false result. This probability is referred to as the false positive rate.
A variant of the original Bloom filter, called counting Bloom filter, uses a table of counters to replace the bits. Each counter represents the number of times the corresponding location has been hit. When a key (such as an IP address) is inserted or deleted, the value of the corresponding counter in each row is increased or decreased by 1, respectively, according to ( ) for all rows. If an IP address is already stored in the modified bloom filter, the counters at locations ( ) 1 , in the table should all be nonzero.
Traffic Digest
Two hash tables, which are based on the counting Bloom filter, are used in our scheme to record informa- When a SYN request packet, corresponding to the first round of a handshake, is captured in the outgoing tra c, the destination IP of the SYN packet is hashed using the independent hash functions and the corresponding counters in hit by the hash functions are incremented by where 0 1. At the same time, another hash table works in the same way but records the source IP information.
When an ACK packet, corresponding to the third round of a handshake, is captured in the outgoing traffic, both the destination and source IP addresses are extracted again and hashed into and , respectively. This time the corresponding counters are decremented by where 0 1. For a normal TCP handshake, both SYN and ACK are observed and hence the corresponding counters are first incremented and then decremented by , leading to no resulting changes. Figure 1 summarizes how tables and are used. All entries in both tables and are reset periodically to prevent them from growing indefinitely when it is under attack and hence many incomplete handshakes are encountered. Suppose 1 is the value of a counter at time 1. Its value is reset to at time as follows:
Although it is possible that two di erent IP addresses are mapped to the same counter in a row, the probability that they get mapped to the same counters in all 1 rows is very low even for a small value of . As a result, the false positive rate caused by hash table collision is rather low.
Detection Mechanism
In this section, we address the problem of detecting change points in the probabilistic characteristics of random sequences. When a packet is identified as suspicious, we analyze its source IP and classify it into one of three categories: random, subnet or fixed spoofing.
Change-Point Detection Method
The essence of sequential change-point detection is as follows. Suppose the observations of a random process (with discrete or continuous time) are received sequentially. At a certain moment (random or not, but unknown), some probabilistic characteristics of this process change. An observer must make a decision as quickly as possible to decide whether or not a change point has happened, while keeping the false alarm rate as low as possible.
Suppose a sequence 1 of independent random variables has been observed. For each 1 , consider the hypothesis that In general ( ) = . We choose a parameter that is the upper bound of , i.e.,
. Then we define = so that it has a negative value under normal operation. When an attack takes place, the rate of increase will suddenly become larger and hence the value = will become positive. The two parameters , the upper bound in case of normal operation, and , the flooding threshold, influence the performance of sequential detection. We should try to strike a good balance by minimizing the detection delay subject to a certain false alarm tolerance level.
Sequence Model
Since the rows in are independent of each other, for clarity, we choose one row for our discussions here. There are counters in each row of table and these counters are denoted as 1 2 . The hash table is refreshed periodically. The value of counter (1 ) forms a sequence { } according to the refresh period . For each counter, we analyze the change-point characteristics of the sequence { }.
Normal TCP tra c has symmetric SYN and ACK pairs and hence the counter values in should be close to 0. When spoofed TCP handshake packets are sent to a victim host, there will be more SYN packets than ACK packets. The corresponding counter value in will grow rapidly. The density function of sequence { } will change and CUSUM will detect this change. We define = ( 0) as the sequence of time for the CUSUM method. The two parameters are set according to the network conditions. Thus has a negative value during normal operation. When a spoofed flooding attack occurs, it will change to a positive value.
When a spoofed flooding attack occurs, each row is expected to have a counter with an abnormally high value. These abnormal counters are referred to as heavy counters. If a packet is hashed into and hits all the heavy counters in all rows, this packet is regarded as a suspicious spoofed packet and hence an alarm will be launched.
Spoofing Type Classification and Response
Since random spoofing generates a wide range of IP addresses for the source IPs of the packets, the probability that two packets have the same source IP is very low. On the other hand, subnet spoofing has a much narrower range than random spoofing. During a spoofed flooding attack, the attacking source typically generates a large number of packets. This number is much larger than the number of candidate IP addresses used for subnet spoofing. For example, in order to bring down a victim server for 10 minutes, there should be at least 300,000 SYN packets [12] . However, a class C subnet only has 254 IP addresses which are available for a subnet spoofing attack. Therefore, quite a number of subnet spoofed packets are expected to have identical source IPs during the attack period.
We define two thresholds, 1 Random spoofing may be throttled by ingress filters deployed at the edge routers. However, there has been a lack of e cient methods for fighting against subnet spoofing. To defend against attacks caused by fixed spoofing and subnet spoofing, we propose here a soft rate-limiting scheme. Specifically, the percentage of tra c to go through is equal to pass = where is value of a counter in and are parameters. The legitimate value of is 0. Thus if is close to 0, we essentially allow almost all tra c to pass through. According to the classification scheme above, a higher value of means that the tra c has a higher probability of being fixed spoofed packets. The larger the value of is, the more tra c will be blocked.
Performance Evaluation
We have carried out some simulation experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. The DARPA o -line intrusion detection benchmark [6] is used for the experiments. We use the NS2 network simulator [1] to simulate the three IP spoofing types.
Attack Traffic Detection
Two datasets from the DARPA benchmark are used to evaluate the detection performance of our method. Specifically, one dataset contains SYN flood attack packets and the other dataset is free of flooding attack. In all the experiments, the number of rows in each hash table is set to 4 and the number of counters in each row is set to 1024. For attack detection, we only need to monitor the destination table . As before, since each row in corresponds to an independent hash function, we only discuss any one row here as other rows are the same.
We first observe the status of during normal operation. Normal tra c begins at 21:00 on one day and ends at 18:32 on the following day. There are a total of 27877 TCP connections during this period. We observe that most of the counters have a zero value and only two counters (out of 1024 counters in the row) have nonzero values. The nonzero values are triggered by incomplete handshakes caused by occasional network errors.
In another experiment, the dataset with SYN flood attack packets is used. During the attack, there are many more SYN packets than ACK packets. The counters corresponding to the hashed values of the victim IP addresses grow dramatically and hence become heavy counters. While most of the counters still have a zero value, there are a few heavy counters with values significantly higher than those of the nonzero counters during normal operation as observed above. The CUSUM detection method can successfully detect these heavy counters. Figure 2 shows the CUSUM result for a nonzero counter when an attack is launched. Since there is very little tra c around midnight, the result for this period is not shown for clarity.
Spoofing Type Classification
We use NS2 to simulate the random spoofing, subnet spoofing and fixed spoofing attack scenarios. In the simulations, there are 10 server nodes and 1000 client nodes. One of the server nodes is selected as the victim. The client nodes randomly select one or more server nodes as destinations for establishing connections. Regardless of what spoofing type is used, we observe that the flooding tra c can trigger one counter in each row of table to have an abnormally large value as above. To classify the spoofing into one of the three types, we have to monitor the counter values in table . Figure 3(a) shows the values of the counters in one row of under random spoofing. The counters have relatively small values which are distributed somewhat uniformly across di erent counters because the spoofed IPs are generated randomly. For subnet spoofing as shown in Figure 3(b) , since a much narrower range of IP addresses is used, we can see that only a portion of the counters have nonzero values. Moreover, these counter values are generally higher than those in Figure 3(a) . If we examine more closely the two tables in Figure 3 (a) and Figure 3(b) , we can see that many different IP addresses are hashed into the same counter in Figure 3 (a) due to hash table collisions, but a counter in Figure 3 (b) almost always corresponds to the same IP address. Figure 3(c) shows the counter values under fixed spoofing. This type of spoofing is much easier to identify since only a few counters have nonzero values and they are heavy counters with extremely high values.
Related Work
A hash table is a high-performance data structure that can be used for e cient table lookup. Recently, it has been applied to some applications for network packet processing. Snoeren [11] presented a technique based on hash table for IP traceback, which generates audit trails for the network tra c so that the origin of an IP packet delivered by the network in the recent past can be traced. Hash table has also been employed to look for imbalance between the incoming and outgoing tra c flows to or from an IP address [2] . More recently, a router equipped with DDoS protection capability called IDR [5] was proposed to detect DDoS attacks using a Bloom filter.
Change-point detection methods have been applied to DDoS detection due to their simplicity and e ectiveness. Wang et al. [12, 13] proposed a method for detecting SYN flood attacks at leaf routers that connect end hosts to the Internet. Based on the observation that SYN and FIN packets form pairs in normal network tra c, they proposed using a nonparametric CUSUM method to accumulate the pairs. Luo and Chang [7] proposed a two-stage scheme to detect the socalled pulsing DoS attacks. The first stage uses wavelet transform to extract the desired frequency components of the tra c data and the second stage tries to detect change points in the extracted components.
Conclusion
Although IP spoofing is not an attack in itself, it is commonly used with real TCP-based attacks by exploiting the characteristics in the design of the TCP/IP suite.
To defend against spoofed flooding attacks, we propose in this paper an e cient method that can detect all three types of spoofing: random, subnet and fixed spoofing. Based on the Bloom filter, we propose a storage-e cient data structure which only requires a fixed-length table for recording relevant tra c information. A change-point detection method, CUSUM, is then applied to detect abrupt changes in the tra c characteristics which correspond to the occurrence of flooding attacks. When malicious events are detected, they can further be classified into random spoofing, subnet spoofing or fixed spoofing type by analyzing a hash table for the source IP characteristics. Simulation experiments show that our proposed method yields very accurate detection and classification results yet with low computational demand. There are some parameters in our method. Currently these parameters are set manually based on experience. A future extension is to devise an automated scheme for setting or adapting the parameters. Another interesting direction to pursue is to design adaptive hash functions that maximize the utilization of the hash table entries and hence minimize the false positive rate. Moreover, we plan to evaluate our method in a reasonably large real network.
